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UMass

Elements of a
Search Strategy

Selects a
President

New

Richard A. Hogarty

The selection of a new university president, an event of major importance in academic
is usually filled with tensions on the part of those concerned about its outcome.

life,

The 1992 presidential search at the University of Massachusetts exemplifies such tenThere were mixed reactions to the overall performance. When they finished

sions.

reviewing candidates, the search committee had eliminated all but Michael K. Hooker,

who, they deemed, has the necessary competence, vision, and stature for the

main

task.

The

conflict centered on the question of "process" versus "product. " The trustees

rejoiced in

what they considered an impressive choice, while many faculty were angered

over what they considered a terrible process. Each side was dismayed at the others behavior. This study focuses

president brings to the

early

In

on the search

itself

and

the leadership potential the

new

office.

December of 1991,

the trustees of the University of Massachusetts

launched a six-month search for a

new

president to head

its

five-campus system.

Their efforts went beyond merely filling a vacancy: their long-term objective was to

someone who could lead the institution to the levels of strength and excellence
would turn it into the top-ranked university envisioned by the special blueribbon panel that had drafted the Saxon Commission Report in March 1989. Their
more immediate objective was to find someone who could help them resolve their
find
that

fiscal crisis

The

and deal with racial divisions on campus.

criteria

developed by the search committee called for a leader of stature and

vision, an institution builder, an individual of personal

were looking for a successor

to Elbert K. Fretwell,

dent for slightly more than a year.
Duffey, whose sudden departure in
fill

and

intellectual integrity.

who had

They

served as interim presi-

He had been recruited to replace president Joseph
March 1991 had left the board of trustees eager to

the position temporarily or at least until they could find a

more permanent

re-

placement. Fretwell, nearing the end of his career, had filled the position on a stop-

gap basis. With nine months of his incumbency remaining, he had been expected
step

down from

office at the

to

end of August 1992.

Richard A. Hogarty, professor of political science, College of Public and Community Seixice, University of
Massachusetts at Boston, is a senior fellow at the John W. McCormack Institute of Public Affairs. University
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Comparing this search for a permanent president with those which preceded it,
one finds some striking similarities and differences. From start to finish, the trustees
went about their work efficiently and expeditiously, announcing the appointment of
Michael K. Hooker as the new president in late May 1992. Curiously enough, the
results of the search produced mixed reactions, if not opposite conclusions, especially

when

it

came

to

drawing distinctions between process and outcome. As events would
were genuinely pleased with the outcome, regarding Michael

verify, the trustees

Hooker as a superb choice. Although many faculty members liked the selection and
seemed reasonably satisfied with Hooker, they were disturbed by the search process,
which they saw as closed, secretive, unilateral, and undemocratic. But more about
that later.

This article examines four separate but interrelated questions.

why

First,

did

Hooker search work as well as it did from the perspective of the trustees and
the members of the search committee? Second, what experience, if any, contributed
to the outcome? Third, why did the faculty object to the search process? Fourth,
what led the participants to reach such a high level of consensus about their final
the

choice? Suitably explored, these and similar questions should shed light on presidential searches in general,

and on the Michael Hooker selection

Before their memories faded and while the evidence was

still

in particular.

fresh and discern-

who were involved in the search. They included all
and faculty members who served on the search committee, plus students,
alumni, faculty governance officials, two chancellors, the chairman of the board of
trustees, and the new president. As a consequence, I have incorporated much of the
ible, I

interviewed most of those

the trustees

information obtained from these interviews into this narrative and used

what actually happened.

In addition,

I

examined

all

it

to interpret

the pertinent public documents

related to the search.

Most studies indicate that there is no perfect way to conduct a presidential search.
Nor is there an ideal model that has universal application. What works at an elite
private institution, for example, does not necessarily work at a public one, since the
public nature of the search exposes

it

to sunshine laws, extensive press coverage,

and

the vicissitudes of state politics. Moreover, the competing forces involve people with
conflicting interests
that

is,

by

and human

frailties.

They

are usually

definition, less than perfect. Division

engaged

in a

group process

and conflict are ordinary and

randomness and unpredictability.
Although the Hooker search exceeded ordinary expectations,

in-

evitable, as are

it

could not avoid

the contentious group conflict and tensions that usually characterize such searches.

These tensions, as we
tion,

shall see,

revolved around issues dealing with affirmative ac-

openness, confidentiality, the selection of the search committee, the balancing of

process and outcome, campus visits by the candidates, and the enduring debate as to

whether a "good search" produces a "good president."
Despite the tension, the
presidential searches

UMass

experiencee

do indeed matter and

is

important because

that, if

it

illustrates that

they are organized properly, they

can identify the most appropriate person for the institution. The results of the search,

however, were by no means limited to the choice of a new president. Interestingly,
the search process afforded a unique opportunity for the university to
priorities

and values and

a consensus

was

to consider the

at best a delicate task,

kind of leadership
but

it

10

it

desires.

served to legitimate the

examine

its

Achieving such

new

president

and

to

smooth

achieved in

his transition into office. Ultimately,

What

this particular case.

follows, then,

most of these
is

results

were

a reconstruction of the search

in all its essential detail.

The Changing Faces of UMass
The UMass community is composed of many different people and many different
parts. UMass was founded in 1863 as a small agricultural school that specialized in
teaching scientific farming methods and researching problems related to growing
crops and animal husbandry. The original aims and directions of UMass have
changed dramatically through the years, but the aims of the School of Agriculture
field research and experi-

remain basically the same. By the turn of the century, nine

ment

stations

were

set

up across the

state to

provide technical assistance to farm

families through the cooperative extension service. Secluded in the farmlands of the

majestic Connecticut River Valley, the original site at Amherst

campus

for the first

setting is largely a

was UMass 's only
this idyllic campus

hundred years of the school's existence. But

memory

frozen in the past as

its

contemporary high-rise dor-

mitories dwarf the surrounding landscape.

Affectionately
state college in

known

as

Mass Aggie,

1931 and to a

full-

with the return of numerous World
tion with their

GI

benefits,

mission expanded in the

were needed

By

the agricultural school

War

1940s and throughout the 1950s.

to teach the large

the early 1960s, with the

numbers of

demand

this state university

for ad-

professors

students.

cities

age,

two

of Boston and Worcester. The

former was created as a nonresidential commuter campus, the
Within

as the

Many more

baby-boom generation reaching college

urban branch campuses were established in the
cal school.

to a

veterans eager to obtain a college educa-

II

UMass/Amherst grew considerably

late

was elevated

fledged university in 1947. Shortly thereafter,

latter as a state

medi-

system, the emergence of newer metropolitan

universities in the population centers of Massachusetts have threatened the premier

position of

UMass/Amherst, whose academic rank is as one of the so-called public
campus, Amherst evokes the most intense alumni loyalties and

Ivies. Still the largest

takes intercollegiate athletics, especially basketball, seriously.

Following the recommendations of the special blue-ribbon Saxon Commission, the
University of Massachusetts system was enlarged in September 1991 from three camfive. At the same time, two separate and distinct public universities at
Dartmouth and Lowell were merged with those at Amherst, Boston, and Worcester.
As a result, the newly configured institution has become a modern comprehensive
university spread across the commonwealth. Managing this complicated system is
no easy task: it employs approximately twelve thousand faculty, professional, and
classified staff, and its overall budget is close to a billion dollars. Collectively, the
five campuses enroll nearly fifty-nine thousand students, who reflect in varying degree the ethnic, racial, and gender composition of the larger society. Besides the normal teenage high school graduates, working adults, single parents, elders, military
veterans, and large numbers of foreign students have added significantly to its
diversity. In the early 1990s, as the demographics of higher education continued to
change, the UMass system was still in the process of defining itself.

puses to

11
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The Role of the UMass President
As

grown and greatly expanded its programs, the job of its
become much more complicated. More diverse groups
and constituencies are sending more messages, making more demands, and applying
greater pressure. The job is not only complex and difficult, but also multidimensional. A modern president is, among other things, chief administrator, chief
the state university has

chief executive officer has

and symbolic and ceremonial head of the

negotiator, chief of external relations,

academic community. The person holding the position wears several hats and performs many duties, ranging from preparing the budget to fund-raising and defusing
explosive racial incidents on campus. 1

As

most

its

and roving ambassador of good

visible advocate

will, the president rep-

resents the university at various ceremonial functions and important civic events.

More

to the point,

he or she plays a

vital role in formulating

central questions of university policy.

The

task requires

and implementing the

someone who

is

relatively

sophisticated about academic life and possesses the vision and leadership ability to

advance

its

mission.

The

effective leader

prehend a broad range of issues but also

must
to

also be equipped not only to

com-

speak clearly about them.

Strengthening the public university and actively marshaling

its

resources

sential leadership role of the president. In dealing with state politicians

is

the es-

and the

media, the president plays an indispensable role in providing needed protection and
lending coherence and meaning to
is

its

mission. Defending

UMass

along these lines

a constant struggle, one in which the incumbent must at times be prepared to do

landmark study of presidential searches, Judith McLaughlin and David
Riesman describe the executive function as follows:
battle. In their

In the public sector of

American higher education, college and university

presi-

dents must defend their institutions daily against the attacks and incursions that
will

make them mediocre. At

same time, they must lobby

the

for the public fund-

ing necessary to maintain and improve their capacities for research and teaching.
In both endeavors, the president

is

a central figure

whose

actions can enhance

public relations or threaten the curtailment of public support.

It is

selves

UMass

obvious, of course, that

—

to feel sure that they

presidents must be inclined to assert them-

ought to lead

matter of values, of approach to political

manifested different
role.

Others have

styles.

Some have

felt that the

conditions of the state,

is

—

if

realities,

aspired to

they are to be effective. This

is

a

and different presidents have
no more than a modest overseer's

only route to administrative success, given the political

to stir

no

promotion as the head of a major

fuss, to

anger no one, to play

institution

somewhere

for example, John Lederle (1960-1970) and Robert

it

safe

and wait for

else. Still other presidents,

Wood

(1970-1977), have firmly

was their duty to step out front and insist on leading.
It helps to remember that these presidents, like other public managers, are mortal
humans with diverse strengths and weaknesses. As Duane Lockard, an observer of

believed that

New

it

England
Too often

state politics, has aptly said:

officials are

offices together

beings.

We

rendered into abstractions by lumping

all

occupants of

and ignoring the tremendous variations that exist among human

sometimes forget

that

some

individuals inspire confidence and can

12

win loyalty and support where others cannot; that some can comprehend complex
situations and see the interrelationships of problems and people and plan coordinated approaches accordingly while others can neither comprehend nor plan or

An

explain.

individual lacking the qualities of leadership occupying an office well-

endowed with formal authority may achieve remarkably little. An official who has
formal power and leadership qualities but who is disinclined to use the authority
he possesses will simply not be comparable to one of equal talents (or perhaps of
lesser talents)
traits,

values

who

is

— even

determined

to get action.

the personal appearance

The

abilities, attitudes,

personal

— of individuals condition

their

effectiveness as leaders.

These human differences assume even greater importance when one takes

into

account the role of the public university president, for the kinds of tasks to be per-

formed require prodigious effort, energy, and patience in addition to ineffable personal qualities and abilities. Because the job is so demanding and survival so
precarious, it is hard to find qualified people who are willing to take on such an
arduous

task.

This

especially true during a period of economic austerity,

is

when

times are hard and the erratic fluctuation of rising costs and falling revenues

squeezes the budget and leaves the president with
In setting objectives or trying to advance

little

room

to

maneuver.

them persuasively under such adverse

conditions, the chief executive finds his or her options severely limited. There

money

simply not enough

these constraints, rational decision

making forces an executive

sizing the internal organization and reallocating
are necessary to keep

its

is

available to sustain the level of service. Operating under

fiscal

house

in order

its

to

engage

in

down-

resources. Difficult decisions

and maintain a robust and responsible

institution.

The

Fiscal Crisis

and Faculty Morale

Between 1988 and 1991, UMass suffered
Depression as
faltering, its

state

the worst financial crisis since the Great

funding declined precipitously. Suddenly, with the economy

immediate financial picture looked

terrible, the

long-run future bleak. In

a protracted series of deep cuts that extended over this four-year period, 30 percent

of

its

budget was slashed. These drastic cutbacks damaged faculty morale and

reduced teaching positions, student enrollment, financial
administrative

staff.

Some academic programs were

aid, library acquisitions,

eliminated, resulting in

and

many

employee layoffs. 4 Hiring freezes were accompanied by a policy of no pay raises.
At one point the faculty and staff found themselves furloughed for a brief period. As
these budgetary pressures mounted, the constant refrain heard on campus was to do
more with less money.
To make up for the shortfalls, it became necessary to tap private foundations and
corporate sources for additional dollars. The university also found that it had to increase student tuitions and fees substantially. But the crippled economy could not be
blamed for all its woes. Some resulted from public dissatisfaction and the loss of
legislative support. The public relations problems, partly the product of diminishing
revenues, were fed by disparities between initial claims and actual performance. Yet
one public opinion survey, conducted in Massachusetts in the late fall of 1989, found
that 68 percent of the respondents would be willing to pay higher taxes if the money

13
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raised were earmarked for the support of public colleges and universities. 5

December 1991, however, UMass financing seemed
been four years

to

much

be as

By

at risk as

early

it

had

earlier.

The Legacy of Previous Searches
At

this point

we have

to take a

previous searches, which

is

few steps backward

in time to see the connection of

1992, the University of Massachusetts had five presidents.

produced them were fraught with

Wood was

selected as the

Between 1970 and
The searches that

essential to reconstructing the story.

first

difficulty in

one form or another.

system president

When

Robert

in 1970, the trustees interrupted the

work of an ongoing search committee and unilaterally imposed their choice. As the
appointing authority, they saw the selection of the chief executive officer as their exclusive prerogative. Such an imposed choice, however, created turmoil and consternation. The intervention by the trustees infuriated the faculty at the flagship campus in
Amherst. Bungling marred the whole episode. The selection of Bob Wood immediately became a flaming symbol of an old-boy network.
On assuming the presidency, Wood was aggressive in asserting control over
external as well as internal affairs. Within relatively short order, his personal style

and mode of operation made him a figure of extreme controversy. He insisted on
micromanaging at the campus level. This posture, coupled with the concentration of
power in the president's office, did not sit well with the campus chancellors. They
chafed at what they perceived as Wood's meddling. Before long, they were competing against each other over issues of internal organization and resource allocation.
Wood won the power struggle, but the costs were high. It eventually led to the resignation of both chancellors
Oswald Tippo at Amherst and Francis Broderick at
Boston. Whatever the problems Wood may have had along these lines, they should
not be allowed to obscure his many notable accomplishments and presidential

—

effectiveness.

In the

wake of

this rebellion, the trustees

adopted a

new

policy on university

governance in the spring of 1973. Recommended by a multicampus committee

headed by Professor Robert Wellman, the policy gave faculty exclusive power over
academic matters. The Wellman Report also outlined areas of "primary responsibility" for initiating action and called for some form of shared governance with
faculty and students. The mood of the times had a great deal to do with bringing
about such reform. As Riesman and McLaughlin remind us:

Civil rights activists and anti-war protesters brought issues of student

the struggles for

campus hegemony. The temporal juxtaposition of

power

into

the increasing

leverage of faculty and the visibility of student revolts had the consequence of

developing a norm in which not only faculty members were included on presidential

search committees, but one or

more students

as well.

Consequently, the Wellman Report not only called for faculty and students to
serve on presidential search committees, but also for
their respective

governance bodies. While

this

new

them

to

moment

new

did not

the tensions that had been building since the creation of the

14

be recommended by

policy diffused for the

system,

it

fundamentally

alter the distribution

of power. 7 The trustees retained their right to

govern the university.

When Bob Wood was

down from

ready to step

office in 1977, the trustees decided

him with Franklin Patterson, whom they named as interim president. Patterson, who was chosen without any faculty consultation or participation, assumed a
modest caretaker role. The same method was followed in 1990, when Joseph Duffey
was chosen for the presidency. Trustee failure to consult faculty had become a recurring pattern. The one major exception was in 1978, when David Knapp was selected
to replace

as president, the first time ever that faculty

search committee.

The

and students participated

in a trustee

Wellman Report and the
and "primary responsibility," but the Knapp

trustees scrupulously adhered to the

governance principles of "joint effort"

search was marred by lack of confidentiality and by a violation of the state's "sunshine" or open-meeting law.

The same mistakes were repeated
president. In a state
this last search

known

for

became highly

its

in 1991,

when

E. K. Fretwell

was appointed

political interference in public higher education,

politicized

and

divisive.

These searches provide

chronological continuity to the story. Taken together, they

left a legacy of mutual
between faculty and trustees that still lingers. 8 Unless one understands the
tensions surrounding them, one cannot fully comprehend the tensions and conflict

distrust

that

surrounded the Hooker search.

There was also the problem of a "revolving door" presidency. The rapid turnover
of three presidents within five years, along with the exit of numerous administrators

and teachers, was alarming

in

terms of institutional

stability.

Adversely affected by

power and prestige of the president's
late 1980s, Governor Michael Dukakis at-

the drastic budget cuts in recent years, the
office

had suffered accordingly. In the

tempted

to abolish the office.

time, he

saw

the

UMass

With a powerful

state

board of regents in place

at the

president's office as an unnecessary layer of bureaucracy.

But he did not succeed. Instead, the state board of regents was abolished by the legislature in 1991 and has since been replaced by a new agency known as the Higher
Education Coordinating Council. There was also a lingering feeling that the expected

was not being
coming search a sense of heightened urgency.
leadership role in the president's office

filled.

All of this gave the up-

Devising a Search Strategy
In this onerous setting, the trustees

were more than eager

to find a

new

leader

who

could assert the authority of the office and revitalize the public university. They

wanted someone who would be able to restore faculty morale and public confidence.
political terrain and what lay ahead, the trustees were somewhat skit-

Unsure of the

about how to conduct a search that would avoid the blunders of yore. They had
ample grounds for concern: no matter what they did, they were bound to be
criticized. To quote McLaughlin and Riesman again:

tish

Questions concerning
stituents

how

how

the search committee will be constituted,

which con-

should be represented with membership on the search committee, and

these representatives should be determined often embroil a

campus

in con-

troversy at the very outset of the search process. Similarly, the question of confidentiality versus publicity is often

one of the most controversial

75

issues.

New England Journal

Against

this

of Public Policy

background, board chairman Gordon Oakes asked trustee Daniel

Taylor to chair the search committee. In naming Taylor, Oakes got as a bonus the
benefit of a strong-minded individual with legal and political experience. 10

A Boston

attorney associated with the prestigious law firm of Hill and Barlow, Taylor

was

talented and well suited for the assignment. Prior to his appointment as a trustee, he

Governor Michael Dukakis, and from 1982 to 1986 he
Nomination Commission, which gave him valuable exscreening and selecting judges. From 1990 to 1991, Taylor had served on

had served

as legal counsel to

had chaired the
perience in

state Judicial

the state board of regents. His professional life provided sufficient flexibility so that

he could devote the requisite time to a search.

He began by

reading everything he

could find on the subject.

Reading and experience

alike

had taught Taylor

conduct a different kind of search

He

this time.

would have to
was no longer

that the trustees

understood that

it

them to act unilaterally. As an attorney, he likewise understood that they
were legally required to conduct a national search which complied with affirmative
action guidelines and the state's open-meeting law. Both Taylor and Fretwell paid a
special visit to David Riesman and Judith McLaughlin at Harvard University. These
two experts in presidential searches discussed with Taylor and Fretwell the requisite
procedures and ground rules for planning and executing a sound search.
feasible for

Though Taylor wanted to find a dynamic leader, his judgment on what to do was
by awareness of what had gone before and might happen again, and also
by the potentials of the present. He knew firsthand how politicized the Fretwell
search had been the previous year. His worst fear was that they might wind up with a
"dull administrative bureaucrat"
a result, he felt, that would condemn the univerdisciplined

—

While he earnestly believed that the kind of motivated leader they
were seeking was out there somewhere, he initially had some doubts about whether
they would be able to attract such a person. 11 Acting on what he knew in terms of institutional history, he set the stage for that new direction. He was to push hard for a
sity to mediocrity.

systemwide approach

On

that score

that

would involve the

five

campuses acting

as a unified entity.

he remained steadfast.

With these thoughts

in

down

mind, Taylor sat

with Gordon Oakes, and they put

together a diverse and well-balanced search committee in terms of ethnic, racial, and

gender composition. They were meticulous

in

naming people whose

stature

and

presence added credibility in useful quarters, and they also appointed to the committee several trustees

search committee

prominent

who

represented both the old and the

was comprised of seven

civic, labor,

new campuses.

All told, the

members, several
alumni of the university, and four sitting

trustees, three faculty

and business leaders,

presidents of other higher education institutions. Interim president E. K. Fretwell

served as an ex officio, nonvoting member.

At the request of board chairman Gordon Oakes, Governor William Weld invited
Neil Rudenstine, president of Harvard University, and Terrence Murray, president of
Fleet Bank, the largest
vitation,

both

men

bank

in

New

England, to join the group. Intrigued by the

in-

agreed to serve. The three other sitting presidents were Stanley

Ikenberry of the University of

Illinois,

Elizabeth

Kennan of Mount Holyoke College,

and Katherine Sloan of Greenfield Community College.
In addition to

Dan

Taylor, the trustees included Joseph Finnerty of

New

Bedford,

Michael Foley of Arlington, Peter Lewenberg of Waban, James O'Leary of Boston,

16

Alan Solomont of North Andover, and student trustee Thomas Winston of Lowell.
three faculty members were Ronald Story from Amherst, Miren Uriarte from

The

Boston, and John Russell from Dartmouth. They were arbitrarily handpicked by

Taylor and Oakes, not by their respective faculty colleagues. Along with a few
others, former

NBA

basketball star Julius Erving and businessman

Lawrence

McKenna represented the alumni. Rounding out the group were James Bailey, a
member of the state Higher Education Coordinating Council, Hugina McNally, a
labor union official, Benaree Wiley, president of a minority

community

organization,

and Bing Lou Wong, a business executive. The search committee's twenty-two

members represented
relations

No

the right political mix, but

some

faculty considered

it

a public

gimmick.

sooner had the membership of the search committee been announced than

Rumblings of discord were heard concerning the composition of the
in which it had been chosen. Campus chancellors were
upset because they were denied representation, and students felt that they were
seriously underrepresented. Faculty at both the Boston and Lowell campuses were
likewise upset because they had not been consulted. The faculty at Lowell contended
that trustee failure to consult them amounted to a breach of their contract. At Boston
trouble started.

committee and the manner

they argued that the trustee action violated provisions of their Faculty Council constitution. In their

view, the constitution was a two-party document that could not be

abrogated without the consent of the other party.

More

serious and worrisome, the faculty complained that the three professors

had been chosen

to represent

faculty governance bodies as

made

little

headway. Professor Charles Knight,

Boston, wrote a forceful

letter to Taylor,

who

chaired the Faculty Council

selves as entitled to have a voice in the selection of the next president.

later explained, "It
12

would have been

Professor Paul Tucker,

who

at

explaining that the faculty regarded them-

The

decisions were briefly contested in an exchange of letters, but to no avail.

point."

who

them had not been recommended by their respective
was specified in the Wellman Report. Such protests

trustee

As Knight

just too disruptive to file litigation at this

served as faculty representative to the board of

from the Boston campus, was of the same opinion. He believed that it would
have been too damaging to the search process. Nevertheless, Tucker argued that the
13
trustee action amounted to "an abrogation of faculty primary responsibility."
Since Taylor was a lawyer, that problem fell initially to him. Taking a firm stand,
he refused to be budged. Not long in coming, though, was the answer to the question.
By the time the faculty had exchanged correspondence with Taylor, the point was
moot. The trustees' charge to the search committee directing it to recommend three
candidates to the board for selection was approved by the trustees on December 4,
1991. In drafting the motion to approve the charge, Taylor carefully worded it to
read, "It is hereby voted, notwithstanding any other policy or procedure to the con14
trary."
It was a subtle power play. By playing this card, Taylor had finessed the
faculty, who were angry. They regarded Taylor's move as deliberately provocative in
nature. But the faculty was too demoralized to protect their legitimate interests.
By a stroke of a pen, the trustees had wiped the slate clean by short-circuiting the
Wellman Report. They purposely did not want to appoint a student and faculty member from each campus. Strategically, their intent here was to foster a sense of "system awareness" and to sharpen sensitivity toward the idea that decisions should be
trustees

17
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made

of Public Policy

in the interests of the university as a

whole. They were concerned that compet-

ing forces from rival campuses might use their influence as potential veto groups,

and that

this set

of circumstances might conceivably lead to stalemate or possible

separatism and division. The trustees also wanted to maintain control of the search

and

new

Above all,
down in what

to reassert their appointing authority.

president without getting bogged

they were determined to find a
they

deemed

as

time-consuming

and counterproductive entanglements over process.
E. K. Fretwell's contribution

was

crucial.

When

he was appointed president he had

agreed not to become a candidate for the permanent position. His pledge sent a message to the outside world that the search was on the level, or at least that

it

was not

rigged for an insider. Fretwell also agreed to help the trustees find a permanent presi-

whom

dent with

committe seek

they could feel comfortable. Moreover, he suggested that the search

its

own independent

space in which to operate.

Following his advice, they obtained an office

downtown Boston, which was

physically

university's central office. This

at

One

International Place in

removed from any campus and from

the

had symbolic importance, reinforcing the impression

that the search committee was running its own show. The downtown location gave
them a place where committee records could be kept under tight security. In all,
Fretwell's counsel made their job a lot easier. The search committee hired Stephen
Kulik, who had worked as a consultant to former president Joseph Duffey at the
Amherst campus, as executive director to coordinate its activities. All their meetings
were posted and held in accordance with the requirements of the Massachusetts open-

meeting law.

Another participant who contributed significantly was Ronald Story.
of history at Amherst, he was secretary of

its

A professor

Faculty Senate and director of the

Fund for the Future. Prior to the search, Story had written a paper entitled
"Our Present Ordeal: A Historical Note," which he presented to an alumni leadership
conference on June 16, 1991. In his paper he traced four distinct cycles of university
growth and looked at the present issue with a sense of both the past and the future. 15
At least in some general way, he brought to bear an understanding of how UMass
had evolved as an institution of higher learning and how it had arrived at its current
predicament in 1991. That understanding contributed immensely to the committee's
University

deliberations.

Afterward, Taylor referred to Story as "the intellectual godfather of the search."

Both men came from public land-grant universities, and both had done graduate work
at similar institutions. Taylor had attended the University of Illinois, Story the University of Texas. Close friends, they frequently went on fishing trips together. More important, both men shared a dream of building a first-class university comparable to
16
the great public universities of the Midwest.
For his part, Story moved expeditiously to help straighten things out with regard
to the thorny issue of faculty consultation.

On

January

7,

1992, an informal coordinat-

composed of faculty governance officials from the five campuses met at
the Publick House in Sturbridge. This group, which was organized at Story's suggestion, was formed partly to facilitate informal faculty involvement in the search and
ing group

partly to

smooth ruffled feathers over the divisive issue of consultation. Fretwell and

Taylor were invited to attend. The main agenda item was the presidential search. This

meeting gave those

in

attendance a chance to sound off and to express their concerns.

18

Before the group adjourned, they agreed to meet

at least

once a month while the

search was going on, an agreement they kept.
It

should be noted that the five campus faculty representatives,

liaison to the

board of trustees, were also part of

this group.

They

who

served as

interacted with the

and shared information with their faculty colleagues. This sort of linkage and
communication was important, because it enhanced the process by making it more inclusive. Yet participants like Paul Tucker sensed that faculty were going to be
trustees

avoided as much as possible.

Launching the Search

A few

wseks

later,

on January 21, the search committee held its first meeting. Piedad
who brought greetings from Governor William

Robertson, secretary of education,

Weld, spoke about the importance of the presidency and higher education's need for
accountability.

Dan Taylor proposed

cated his desire to conclude

it

a schedule for carrying out the search and indi-

by the June 3 meeting of the board of

trustees.

outlined three tasks that needed to be done and asked for volunteers to

These tasks involved (1) developing a case statement;
package; and (3) selecting a search firm. 17

Given

(2) establishing a

He knew what

then

compensation

his prior experience in selecting state judges, Taylor put a high

confidentiality.

He

work on them.

premium on

could go wrong and was afraid that attractive can-

names were disclosed prematurely. Similarly, he
news media might dismantle the search process if there were
Several trustees on the search committee believed that strict confidentiality

didates might be scared off if their

feared that intrusive
leaks.

should be maintained until the

full

board had made

its

selection. In other words, they

no one, except the members of the search committee and the board, should
ever know the identity of any candidate other than the new president. They honored
this commitment.
felt that

A lengthy

discussion then followed on the kind of leadership they desired.

The

search committee agreed to disagree about specific candidates, especially at this early
stage of the search. Their discussions were far-ranging but centered on the question

of whether the university faced a long-term or short-term managerial problem. Im-

provement depended on personalities and circumstances.
that if

it

was a short-term problem,

tough managerial decisions, even

On

the other hand, if the

preciably.

Under these

it

On

the one hand, they felt

required bringing in someone

at the risk

who would make

of alienating the academic community.

problem was a long-term one, the dynamic changed ap-

conditions, they felt that a

new

president could not win the
at large. They pretty much
"The tenor of this discussion

long-term battle without genuine support from the faculty

decided that their dilemma

fell into the latter

the single most important determinant of the search," Ron Story
evoke the feeling in the room. 18

was
to

category.

The next

step

was

later said, trying

to select the search consultants. After soliciting proposals

from

ten recognized executive search firms, the subcommittee interviewed three and chose

Academic Search Consultation Service (ASCS), a nonprofit firm based in WashingD.C. This firm, run by Ronald Stead and Allan Ostar, had a good track record in
working with public universities. Stead himself was a graduate of Michigan State
University. Trustee Michael Foley checked them out thoroughly. In his words, "They

ton,
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not only understood the cost factor and were reasonably priced, but they also were
not in

it

to rip us off."

was very

19

Stanley Ikenberry, president of the University of Illinois,

helpful in selecting the consultants.

As things developed, it became clear that Stead and Ostar knew their business.
They had previously been involved in some 127 searches in higher education. They
operated with the utmost integrity and extended the reach of the search committee.
trust relationship

to realize that the search

was on

the level, especially

trustee jokingly remark, "This search
tually discovered

A

soon developed between them. Meanwhile, Stead for his part came

is

when he heard an

unidentified

wired to be nonpolitical." 20 Since

Michael Hooker, they were well worth

ASCS

even-

their price.

Formulating the Announcement

The

early stages of the search proceeded routinely. Through February and into
March, Dan Taylor met personally with each of the five chancellors, their senior
staff, and in some instances, academic deans and student leaders as well as with key
central office staff.

The views of

several prominent educators outside the university

were also sought. At the same time, the search consultants undertook a similar
of meetings to develop their

own views

shared their findings with the trustees in a detailed

memorandum mentioned

series

of the university's leadership needs. They

memorandum. While

the various pitfalls and priorities of the search,

this
it

also urged

the trustees to provide the budget necessary to run the president's office before the

new

president was appointed. If this was not done, the next executive would be
blamed for the inevitable need to increase the resources to operate the office. 21 That
was wise, considering what Taylor ultimately set out to achieve.
These meetings, aided by discussions within the search committee, produced a
draft "Announcement" that defined the objectives of the search and made the case
for why a motivated leader should want to seek the UMass presidency. Ron Story
wrote the initial draft of the document, which was then widely circulated on the five
campuses. It served as the basis of discussion at public hearings, which were held on
each campus in early March. Those who spoke at these hearings commented on the
qualities that they would like to see in the new president. Taylor had to keep his case
focused on this issue distinct from and unimpaired by the hostility he himself might

arouse while doing such work.

Taylor himself was highly involved in this second phase of the search.

He

talked

frankly with the various constituencies on campus, in terms befitting their status, ap-

pealing more to logic than to parochial campus views, offering the outline of a

lawyer's brief and asking them to help him

fill it in.

Taylor avowedly sought to

start

He gave them a
Faculty members were

a dialogue and offer a process that allowed for appropriate input.

chance

to air their complaints

and welcomed

their feedback.

worried that the trustees might prefer a nonacademic person, perhaps someone from
the business

community or

the political world.

After the public hearings, Taylor revised the case statement and integrated the cam-

pus feedback into

it.

The document no doubt benefited from such

contributions.

It

described the presidential job opening as providing a challenging opportunity for

someone
tive

"to leave his or her indelible

mark on this unshaped system." This incenit: "Through the power of words, we

had a powerful appeal. As Taylor put

20

encouraged people out there to take a shot at us. We didn't complain about the
budget cuts, and we didn't promise them a bed of roses." 22
Despite

person

who

length, the

its

who

document made very

could lead, not simply manage.

clear that the

More

committee was seeking a
wanted someone

precisely, they

possessed four basic qualities: (1) a leader of public stature; (2) a creator of

and

vision; (3) an institution builder;

(4)

an individual of personal and intellectual in-

Under each of these categories they listed numerous other criteria. 23 In sum,
they wanted a high-energy "evangelical" leader who would hit the road and take the
message of the university to the far corners of the state. The job profile left no doubt
tegrity.

as to the kind of visionary person they

had

in

mind, and everyone benefited from

this

clarity.

But

as ever in Massachusetts,

it

was

the person in

the focus of attention swiftly shifted to the

from a priviliged Yankee Brahmin
patrician by disposition, Weld was

new

power

that mattered most, so

social background. Harvard-educated
fast

who came

governor, William Weld,

becoming

and a

a convert with regard to the impor-

tance of public higher education to the state's economy. Not long in office and

had threatened

to close

still

when he

popular, he had changed his position dramatically from the previous year,

some public colleges and impose harsh budget cuts. Speaking
and civic leaders at UMass/Boston on March 6,

to a conference of environmentalists

Weld

declared:

The more
ter

like

I

I

it.

see of our system of public higher education in Massachusetts, the betI

do not think

and not everything
say

it

up a

when we

again, that

little bit

sure,

works

in

money works. However,

get a

education costs money,

I've said before, and

I'll

of daylight and the fiscal crunch eases

little bit

in Massachusetts, higher education will

line, at least tied for first

To be

that everything that

that costs

be standing,

if

not

first in

place with the claimants on our public resources.

-4

Weld's conversion along these lines was an important development, be-

cause his support would later bolster the search

at

a crucial stage.

The Compensation Package
Meanwhile,

in late

March, a subcommittee composed of trustees Finnerty, Lewen-

berg, O'Leary, and Taylor, plus

James Bailey of the Higher Education Coordinating

Council, began working on an executive compensation report to establish salary

UMass presidency. The salary issue, which had been troublesome
had not been reviewed or revisited since the merger in 1991. It was of
crucial importance to the overall scheme of things. According to them:
guidelines for the
in years past,

The
lot

last thing

we

need, as one of our Chancellors put

of balls up in the

knows they

air

and then leaves

after 3 or

it,

is

someone who

can't catch them. Clearly, building the kind of top-ranked public

university system that the Trustees desire will take a solid, ten-year effort

new

President.

end to be

gets a

4 years because he or she

The Trustees should not expect

in sight in ten years.

But with the right leader, ten years

time to reach the end of the beginning.

25
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the job to be finished, or for the
is.
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The goal here was

recommend

would enable the trustees to offer
would compare favorably with those at
similar public universities across the country. What is more, they wanted to be able
to accomplish this goal before the search committee began considering candidates.
By so doing, they could avoid the possible embarrassment at the end of the search
of the impression that they were haggling over salary, or that the person they had
picked was holding out for more money. As they said:
to

guidelines that

a competitive salary and fringe benefits that

Principles of equity and fairness are served in the short term by doing this now.

And

long-term harmony

doesn't

come with

is

also fostered if the

new

on the one hand,

President,

the idea that the Trustees are cheap and will have to be reedu-

cated along the way, and the Trustees, on the other hand, don't feel that they were

taken to the cleaners.

Since the compensation question was such a sensitive issue politically, they did
not want to saddle the

new

president with the political liability of a package being

designed specifically for him or

her.

Other public university systems were surveyed
chief executive officers, and published data
tee

recommended

to

determine the salary of their

was researched. The UMass subcommit-

a basic salary of $150,000 to $175,000.

By

comparison, former

president Joseph Duffey had been paid $130,000, plus a $30,000 annuity payable at
his retirement.

Among

other fringe benefits, the subcommittee

recommended

housing allowance be somewhere between $19,000 and $30,000, and
noninterest-bearing second mortgage loan of up to $200,000 be
to

if

made

available, this

be repaid when the president's house was sold. The subcommittee made

mendations

to the full search

report through

its

recom-

its

committee, which in turn endorsed and forwarded the

chair to the board of trustees in early April. These

tions received active

that the

necessary, a

endorsement by the

trustees.

would be negotiated with the person who was

From

recommenda-

then on, the salary issue

finally selected as president.

Casting the Net

On March

15, the

"Announcement," along with a cover

letter

from Dan Taylor, was

mailed to more than nine hundred knowledgeable people, asking them for suggestions and assistance in developing a pool of prospects.

As

is

true in

most presidential

searches, advertisements were placed in publications such as The Chronicle of

Higher Education and Black Issues
deadline was mentioned.

On

in

Higher Education.

this point,

saying that the search committee planned to present

by the summer of 1992. The troubles

some feared
Once the

at

No

specific application

Taylor created some breathing
its

room by

report to the board of trustees

UMass had been widely

publicized, and

27

it would be difficult to attract good candidates.
was fully cast, names of prospects came to the search committee
from four different sources. First, seventeen applications were received in response to
the advertisements. Second, in response to the March Announcement mailing, fiftythree names were suggested as possibilities. Third, members of the search committee

that

net

suggested forty names. Fourth, the search consultants developed a
prospects.

28
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list

of thirty-nine

At

its

April 6 meeting, the search committee began to focus on potential

prospects.

Names

like U.S.

Army

General H.

Norman Schwarzkopf and former

U.S.

Senator Paul Tsongas surfaced. Although Tsongas had chaired the state board of
regents,

it

was

felt that

he carried too much

political

baggage. Nobody wanted to see

a repetition of the clamorous public spectacle that took place in 1991,

when former

Massachusetts House Speaker David Bartley sought the position and the search be-

came

highly politicized. These past mistakes were to be avoided as

At one point
in order to

in the

much

as possible.

meeting, trustee Michael Foley, a medical doctor, suggested that

be sure they were getting the best pool of applicants possible, they should

think of three people in their

own

back the names of three prospects

fields

of endeavor.

in the field

He

then went out and brought

of medicine.

By

this time,

however,

most of the participants were looking for an academic rather than a politician or a
business executive. Although they did not formally rule out the category, there was
general agreement that they would consider only an extraordinary nonacademic as a
strong contender.

29
lists. The search committee reviewed
on a limited number. Most of the people were

Several duplicate names surfaced on the four

them and decided

to focus

its

attention

then contacted by the search consultants to determine their level of interest,

if

any, in

was on twenty-seven
prospects from throughout the country. In comparison with previous searches, it was
a shallow pool of prospects. Of these, nine were women, and eight were AfricanAmericans. Several were chief executives of campuses within public university systems. A few were high-level system executives. Some were deans of colleges at
public universities. Still others had distinguished themselves in academic life and
public affairs. Soon after this screening, the search committee decided that they
would not pursue anyone at the dean level or below. They were warned that their
focus on "prospects" did not necessarily imply any reciprocal interest, and in many
instances that proved to be the case. All in all, a number of well-qualified individuals
the presidency. During this third phase of the search, the focus

expressed preliminary

interest.

The name of Michael Hooker, who was then president of
Maryland, Baltimore County,
Allan Ostar's

—

list.

first

A gifted

the University of

appeared on the consultants'

— Ronald Stead and

scholar and highly respected administrator generally

recognized as having a talent for leadership, Hooker seemed to them to be an attractive candidate.

He

also

had a reputation for taking

builder and an innovator.

—

risks.

By temperament, he was

a

of his curriculum vitae revealed his record of

he had edited two books and published eighteen articles in
academic discipline of philosophy. 30 Stead knew of his availability and contacted

scholarly publications
his

A check

Hooker to determine if he might be interested in the job. At first pass. Hooker turned
Stead down, mainly because he did not believe that the Massachusetts economy
would rebound quickly enough. Under such circumstances, he saw himself having to
implement more budget cuts for the next five years. Since Hooker was more interested in building an institution than in downsizing it, he saw no point in pursuing the

UMass
But

presidency any further.

Taylor and the search committee from courting him. Sensing
from the start that Hooker might be a prize catch, someone who might more than
meet the search committee's criteria, they persisted in their efforts and managed to
convince him that the situation in Massachusetts was promising despite the state's
sluggish economy. Actively countering all his doubts, they persuaded Hooker to
this did not stop
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apply for the university presidency. At the time, he was under serious consideration
for the presidency of the College of William and
plications in his private

Meantime,

UMass

life,

Mary

in Virginia, but

owing

to

com-

he was undecided about his next career move.

in mid-to-late April, those prospects

who

expressed interest in the

presidency were invited to meet informally with a small group of search

committee members. These exploratory sessions were designed to determine whether
the committee wanted to encourage further involvement, and conversely, whether the
individual wished to pursue his or her preliminary attraction.

At

the

May

6 meeting

of the search committee, Taylor announced that with regard to their affirmative ac-

had been made, but noted that there was no further interon the part of those identified. Because of the severe funding problem

tion efforts, serious contacts
est expressed

and the perceived negative

who met

racial climate in Boston, several

good minority candidates

the affirmative action profile either withdrew or refrained from pursuing
31

Nevertheless, some critics felt that the search committee should
have pursued the minority candidates as vigorously as they pursued Hooker.
their candidacy.

By

the end of the

May

6 meeting, the search committee decided which prospects

they desired to invite back for another meeting.

They had narrowed

their short list to

four candidates, none Hispanic or African- American, and only one female. 32 At this
point, Taylor

went back

board of trustees and asked them to change their

to the

charge to the search committee to allow

The

it

to

recommend

four candidates instead of

do so. With four "good fish" in
the net, Taylor saw no point in delaying the process any further. Rather than let the
process drag out until early summer and run the risk of losing their catch, he accelerated the schedule by two weeks and moved up the next meeting of the search
three as originally specified.

committee

to

May

trustees agreed to

12.

Landing Michael Hooker

On May

12 the search committee met with the four finalists,

pleted legal forms asserting their privacy rights.

and comments would be kept

all

of

whom

They were assured

in strictest confidence.

As

had com-

that their

names

a precautionary measure,

Taylor had lined up in advance sufficient votes to go into executive session to
achieve this objective.
sary.

As

He was even

willing to risk a lawsuit should

a lawyer, he felt that case law

would support

it

prove neces-

their position, but

no one chal-

lenged them on the issue. Consequently, the privacy of the candidates was well
preserved and their identities remained a closely guarded secret.

two groups for interview purposes, making
saw one another. During the course of these interviews, both groups asked each candidate the same set of questions:

The search committee then

split into

sure that none of the candidates

Based on your current understanding, what interests you the most in this position
and what are your reservations? What would be your priorities for the first six
months of your administration? What is the most difficult decision you've had to

make

recently?

What have been your successes in regard to addressing the needs
What would your message be to the opinion leaders of

of minorities on campus?

the state and the campuses with regard to improving race relations and the education of minority students?

33
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Of the four finalists, Michael Hooker quickly emerged as the leading contender.
He was an ambitious as well as an able man. More than that, in the view of the
search committee, he had impressive credentials and a record of administrative

achievement

in

both the private and public sectors of higher education. Hooker had

earned his B.A. degree with highest honors

1969

in

at the

University of North

where he majored in philosophy. Continuing to do graduate
work in the same field, he went on to the University of Massachusetts at Amherst,
where he received his M.A. in 1972 and his Ph.D. in 1973. To the extent that there is
a customary career line to a university presidency, Hooker had pursued it. From a
faculty position at Harvard University, he moved to Johns Hopkins University,
where, from 1975 to 1982, he held a variety of posts. He first served as assistant
professor of philosophy, then as assistant dean and associate dean, and finally, at the
age of thirty-five, as dean of undergraduate and graduate studies.
From 1982 to 1986 Hooker served as president of Bennington College in Vermont,
Carolina

Chapel

at

where he

first

Hill,

achieved public notice as a skilled

admits that as a "rookie president" he did not

fiscal

know

manager. In retrospect, he

the right questions to ask

On his first day in office, he was informed that there was not enough
meet the payroll at the end of the month. To make matters worse, he inherited a weak and unprofessional administrative apparatus. In short order, Hooker
oversaw a refinancing of Bennington's debt, using long-term tax-exempt bonds that
beforehand.

money

to

included a provision for repayment. In addition, he demonstrated an ability to raise a
substantial
total gift

amount of money,

in fact raising

support by 80 percent.

He

more than $6 million and increasing

also streamlined the college's marketing strategy,

its board of trustees. Commade some tough decisisons that
enabled the college to survive its fiscal crisis. The evidence of his accomplishments
is documented in a detailed case study written by a faculty member at the Yale

professionalized

its

administrative

staff,

and strengthened

mitted to holding the line on spending, Hooker

School of Management. 34
After this success, Hooker accepted the presidency

Baltimore County

(UMBC),

in 1986,

at the

where he continued

to

University of Maryland,

make

a

name

for him-

no one who knew him, he brought about change in two
specific areas: improving academic quality and increasing access, especially for
minority students. During his six years there, which extended from 1986 to 1992, he
boosted enrollment by 20 percent at the undergraduate level and 150 percent in
self.

To the

surprise of

graduate programs. Student retention also improved, with the

number of bachelor's

degrees granted increasing by 53 percent.

Hooker took

fresh initiatives on a variety of fronts.

He

established an honors

college and launched the much-publicized Meyerhoff Scholarship Program for black
students

who were

gifted in science

Maryland's business community.

He

and technology. He also
initiated

built strong links with

new academic programs

in biotech-

nology, biochemical engineering, and bioprocess manufacturing, and with the help of

business corporations like Westinghouse and Martin Marietta, he began
specializations in photonics and robotics. Furthermore, he developed a

new

working

model of collaboration between UMBC and Catonsville Community College. 33
On another front, Hooker had been working on a proposed merger between
UMBC and the medical school in downtown Baltimore. In order to achieve the political support necessary to get the enabling legislation passed in the Maryland legislature, he had to build an alliance between the rival city and county legislative
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had been

traditionally

odds with each

at

other.

While engaged

in

endeavor, he suddenly realized that there was one remaining obstacle in the way,

namely, himself. Perceived as an empire builder by medical faculty

budget threatened, Hooker sensed that things would go much better

Such a move was, of course, extremely good

gracefully.

politics.

who saw their
if he bowed out

As soon

as he

declared that he would not be a candidate for the head of the merged institution, the
legislative proposal gained

Amid

momentum.

speculation about Hooker's altruistic motives, the bill

was approved by

the

governor, the board of regents, the commissioner of education, and the House of Representatives, but

it

was

for

him

to

move

committee

killed in

decided that he had done

all that

in the state Senate.

he could possibly do

at

At this point, Hooker
and that it was time

UMBC

on.

For these reasons, Hooker impressed the search committee and the other trustees

who were

invited to

confident.

He conveyed

in

sit

on the interviews. His point of view was fresh, eager, and
and courage the future was

his belief that with political will

manageable. In laying out his vision of the future university, Hooker provided them
with persuasive and imaginative ideas.

and absolutely confident about
university that

would meet

formance, from

all

fit

committee

demands of
was impressive.

the societal

accounts,

Hooker came across
dent and

He seemed

in full

command

his ability to build a diverse

of every question

and interactive public

the twenty-first century. His per-

in the interviews as an ideal person to

fill

the role of presi-

criteria better than the other three candidates.

According

to

Professor Miren Uriarte, "Hooker had presented the most coherent vision of the role

of public higher education in this

state,

both in terms of access to minorities, and in

terms of cost." 36 Hooker's major shortcoming was that he lacked experience in run-

ning a university system.
likely to

micro manage

situation at

UMBC,

More

at the

manager of details, he was not
he had operated under such a
was like to operate in the shadow of a

a visionary than a

campus

level. Actually,

and he understood what

it

"flagship campus."

At

forty-six years of age,

step in his career ladder.

On

Hooker saw
this point,

the

he

UMass

felt

opportunity as the next logical

confident that he could do a good job

was one reason why the UMass presidency appealed to him.
was a relatively new system, at least as far as the addition of the Dartmouth and
Lowell campuses was concerned. The other reasons for job appeal were that Hooker
was a UMass alumnus who loved the game of politics and wanted to come back to
Massachusetts. 37 The four years he had spent at UMass/Amherst during the early
1970s would stand him in good stead.
Hooker was such a striking personality that committee members could not help
looking at the other colorful aspects of his life. He was born in Richlands, Virginia,
on August 24, 1945, the only son of a coal miner. Soon after his birth, the family
moved to the heart of Appalachia in West Virginia near the Kentucky border, where
they lived in the midst of abject poverty. At the school young Hooker attended, most
of the boys in his class chewed tobacco and wore no shoes. Many of the people
living in this rural mountainous region suffered from stark deprivation that resulted
from disease, poverty, and malnutrition. Growing up in a coal-mining town, Hooker
came to understand the problems of working people and why they needed labor
unions to protect them. His whole outlook on life was to be deepened by this
as a system head. That
It

sobering experience.
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To see how Hooker's life as a coal miner's son shaped his values, one more inmust be added to the composite of his makeup. From early childhood, his
parents had told him repeatedly that he was the smartest kid around. They stressed
sight

the importance of education. In fact, they consciously decided to have only one child

because they wanted him to obtain a college education

in

order to

make

it

out of the

him around during summer vacations
to see college campuses in the South, but they were too ashamed of their poverty to
get out of their automobile. Hooker believed deeply in what he was first taught. As
he recalls, "My father had desperately wanted to go to college, but he had to work in
coal mines. In his high school years they drove

the

mines

in order to take care

He

taught

me two

things

nobody." 38 This became a defining
experiences,

on the

who

of his father,

— nobody

is

suffered from black lung disease.

better than you,

moment

for him.

Hooker grew up acquiring humility on

other. This

and you are better than

As

a result of these childhood

the one

dichotomy explains a great deal about

hand and self-confidence
and mode

his personal style

of operation.

Coming from such humble

origins

and achieving such success, Hooker struck a

responsive chord with the search committee. They saw him as someone

who

not only

understood and appreciated the value of public higher education, but also as someone

who
that

could take

it

to a higher level of quality, diversity,

and access. The trustees

felt

Hooker's intimate knowledge of UMass/ Amherst, obtained while he was a

graduate student there, would enable him to hit the ground running. They liked the

They also liked the idea
UMass/Boston and that he had

idea that he had both public and private sector experience.
that he

had headed an urban campus similar

to

worked closely with a medical center similar to UMass/Worcester. In fact, the
similarities between UMBC and UMass/Boston were striking. Most of all, they liked
the track record that he had established in terms of promoting good race relations. 39
This had direct revelance to UMass/Amherst, where racial tensions had reached an
all-time high in recent years. Hooker also had established a good rapport with the
clerical and professional staff at UMBC. All this seemed clear enough to the trustees.
They were definitely not interested in anyone who was nearing the end of his or her
career. Hooker, at forty-six, was still in his prime. As was becoming rapidly apparent,
he seemed fully qualified for the job.
At the conclusion of the May 12 interviews, the members of the search comittee
had reduced their options to three prospects. Ranking them, they unanimously recommended Hooker as their first choice. They admired his abilities and understood his
limitations. Their

consensus for

dent trustee,

was settled. Hooker was
only name they forwarded to

So

it

the person they

their

wanted for

was the
the full board of trustees. All
members on the search committee concurred with this decision. The stuThomas Winston of UMass/Lowell, was noticeably absent from this

the job. Thus, his

three faculty

comparisons of him with the other three candidates sharpened

selectivity.

meeting.

Obscured from public view by the shroud of secrecy that concealed their identhe other three prospects remain a mystery to the outside world, including the
academic community. As a consequence, they quickly faded into complete

tities,

anonymity. The accounts that

come down

to us reveal only the vaguest kind of iden-

them were professional academic administrators, and all
of them headed an institution of higher learning. None came from New England. One
tifying characteristics. All of
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was a female, another was near
the interviews, the search

An Abbreviated

the end of his career. Based on what they heard in
committee decided not to recommend the fourth candidate.

Courtship

Because the search was moving so rapidly at this point, the courtship of Michael
Hooker was fast and furious. It was not a prolonged romance. As Hooker himself
explained, "The committee saw very quickly that
ing for, and they were able to convince

afforded what

because

As

I

was looking

we each knew

for.

So

I

me

I

was exactly what they were look-

reasonably quickly that

would say

that

it

was a

this

opportunity

fairly short courtship,
40

a great deal about the other before the courtship began."

the talks continued,

for the next ten years, a

Hooker assured the trustees that he planned to stay at UMass
commitment all participants felt was essential for the next

president.

Nevertheless,

Hooker would not commit himself one way

or the other until after

He wanted
where they stood on public higher educa-

he had a chance to speak with the key political leaders in Massachusetts.
to take
tion.

some soundings from them

No

to see

longer a neophyte president, he

Arrangements were made for him

knew

the "right questions" to ask this time.

meet with Governor William Weld, a Republican, and Senate president William Bulger and House Speaker Charles Flaherty, both
Democrats. He also met with Piedad Robertson, the secretary of education, and Paul
Marks, the chancellor of higher education. These preappointment meetings went well.
Hooker came away from them feeling that he could garner the necessary political support to build the twenty-first-century university that he had in mind. With such assurances, he agreed to accept the job for a five-year term. Behind the scenes, the
trustees earlier that spring had received strong signals from the governor's office and
from the legislative leadership that they could expect a favorable budget if they made
41
a good selection.
Another cause of concern, from Taylor's standpoint, was how to introduce Hooker
to the chancellors and faculty leaders without blowing his cover. Worried about possible leaks if the work of the search committee were conducted on campus, the
lawyer-trustee who chaired the search committee had ruled out the possibility of campus visits by the candidates. Not everyone was happy with this development. It
meant that the five chancellors and their respective constituencies had yet to meet
Hooker. They were peeved, not without justification, because they had not been allowed to interview him before the search committee had made its recommendations
to the

to

board of trustees. 42

Understandably, the chancellors as a group

felt that

they had been completely

bypassed. They saw this intentional omission and the disallowance of campus
as a "double failure" in process.

chance

to get to

know

It

the candidates, but the candidates in turn had no chance to

respond to campus concerns. The problem was partially resolved, but

pen

until twenty-four

On May

hours before the

full

it

did not hap-

board of trustees voted.

26, the chancellors, along with the informal group of faculty governance

officials, finally got to

meet Hooker

at the central office in

Boston.

troduced him to the assembled group, he reportedly remarked,
in

visits

not only meant that the five campuses had no

"We

When
are

our stealth mode." 43 Both the chancellors and the faculty members

28

Taylor in-

still

operating

felt that this

Such treatment rankled them and reinforced the earmuch as possible. As they saw it, the
decision had already been made and the vote of the board, which was scheduled for
the next day, was a mere formality.
While Hooker was making the rounds at the State House on May 26, he did not
pass unnoticed. Word of his being the unanimous choice of the search committee was
leaked to the press. Anthony Flint, writing in the Boston Globe, broke the story the
44
When it appeared, Taylor was upset with the leak. Prior to the appearance
next day.
of the news story, all aspects of the search had been kept confidential. Now all that
was gone in an instant. Since the news story came out the very day that the trustees

was secrecy

lier

carried to extremes.

impression that they were to be avoided as

voted,

it

did not seriously hurt Hooker's position.

Meanwhile, Taylor had been busy checking out Hooker with his former employers
and other leading educators. Following standard operating procedure for such highlevel appointments in state government, the state police conducted its own separate
background investigation. On May 20, both trustee Joseph Finnerty and faculty member Ronald Story flew to Baltimore to check out Hooker on their own and to talk
with others

at

UMBC

As Finnerty

about him as a potential president for UMass.

later explained,

"The

kick the tires of the automobile that
variety of people, including

trip

provided us with a chance to go

we were going

to buy."

45

UMBC provost Adam Yarmolinsky;

dent of the medical school; Theodore Peck, a housing expert;

member
the

MIT

He spoke

down and

with a

Errol Reese, presi-

Thomas Chmura,

a

of the Greater Baltimore Committee; and Barbara Plantholt, a graduate of

Sloan School of Management,

all

of

whom

had nice things

to say

about

Hooker. For example, Plantholt candidly told Finnerty, "Grab him. This guy can

down

at the table

belongs

with the presidents of Harvard and MIT, and you will

at the table."

know

sit

that he

46

The responses Story solicited were much the same. He talked with three faculty
members, two campus academic administrators, one central office administrator, and
one minority student. Freeman Hrabowski, a black professional administrator at
UMBC, told Story that "Hooker had turned the institution around on a dime."
Hrabowski was impressed with how he had arranged functions. For example, Hooker
had placed athletics under student affairs, which resulted in a more constructive
47
relationship between athletics and the quality of student life.
A female clerical worker who gave Finnerty and Story a ride to the airport told
them that one of the things she liked most about Hooker is that he made her feel important at the end of the workday. Perhaps of greater significance were the insights
provided by Willie Lamouse-Smith, a professor of African-American studies, who
commented: "Hooker goes out to put forward ideas and to fight with the politicians
and get us what we need to build this place. Before he came, this place was always
48
the whipping boy for the Baltimore papers. Nobody whips us around anymore."
All
these accounts suggested that Hooker had good political skills when it came to dealing with the news media and with the political establishment.
But on the negative side, an ethical cloud hovered over Hooker's personal finances. In another article that appeared in the Boston Globe, Anthony Flint reported
that Hooker may have improperly used money from the University of Maryland Foundation for his mortgage payments, baby-sitters, and lawn furniture. 49 Reacting to the

negative publicity he had received, Hooker claimed that he had done no wrong.

Acknowledging

that he

may have made

a "political error" in spending the

29

money

for
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had been negotiated as part of his overall compensation
he apparently satisfied the scrutiny of the trustees as
police who had investigated the matter.

such purposes, he said that
package.

On

it

this sticky point,

well as the state

When

all

to the

board of trustees.

background checks had been completed, Taylor was ready
He asked Gordon Oakes to schedule a special meeting,
which was held on May 27. There Taylor gave a full report of the search and
go

the various

thoroughly briefed his colleagues. Despite

Hooker the presidency ended

its

in anticlimax.

unanimous. 50 Earlier actions foretold such

to

drama, the vote of the trustees to offer

There was

results,

little

discussion.

had anyone cared

The vote was
The

to notice.

committee's unanimity meant more than most people realized.
After this meeting, Hooker held a press conference in which he spoke about the
state economy and its citizens. He
would be to instill public confidence in the
university, declaring: "I am convinced that one can rebuild public confidence, public
51
trust, and public pride."
At the same press conference, search consultant Ron Stead
publicly acknowledged that of the 128 searches in which his firm had been involved,
this one was by far the most efficient. The Hooker appointment became effective on
September 1, 1992.
As things turned out, the trustees offered Hooker a salary of $175,000. This figure
represented a 35 percent increase over what former president Joseph Duffey had been
paid. When all the fringe benefits were added to Hooker's base salary, the total com-

importance of the university to the future of the
also

announced

that his first priority

pensation package

came

close to $200,000. Other major public university systems

cite a few examples, Rutgers University in New Jersey,
Michigan State University, and the University of Maryland all pay their presidents

were

in a similar range.

$175,000.

On

a

To

somewhat higher

scale, the University of

$203,000, while the University of California pays
includes deferred compensation).

When

Texas pays

its

president

system head $307,000 (which

one compares these figures with those of

Hooker, his pay was competitive and not out of

Once information about

its

line.

was released, however, it
evoked a public outcry and produced much adverse publicity, which was not unexpected. Newspaper editorials sternly rebuked the trustees for paying Hooker what
the compensation package

they considered to be an outrageous salary. 52 So did

some faculty members. 53 Since
had not received any pay raises over the past four years, the
issue was bound to be controversial. It was a no-win situation for the trustees and the
president: there was no way to rationalize his high salary in an atmosphere of
economic stagnation, high job losses, and scarce state resources. Yet, on balance, the
compensation package seemed to them justified, even if it seemed excessive to the

both faculty and

staff

general public.

Gaining Perspective:

Two

Schools of Thought

For more than twenty years the trustees and faculty

at

UMass have

question of power in presidential searches. The dispute

fought over the

modern one for the
simple reason that only two decades ago, few people saw anything wrong with the
trustees unilaterally selecting a president. Before Robert Wood's time, most faculty
members accepted the premise that the appointment was the exclusive prerogative of
is

a

the trustees. In the early 1970s, faculty and students challenged that premise and

30

sought to have a voice

governance.

in university

cepted that most of them believed

UMass

is

it

was

In

due course, the ideal of par-

Wellman Report, became

ticipatory democracy, as enshrined in the

so universally ac-

a reality. If the intensity of the dispute at

unusual, the issues are essentially no different from those

at

other colleges

and universities.

Borrowing from the

field of

contemporary

political theory,

I

think

it is

helpful to

analyze the recent controversy in the framework of the community power debate,

which contrasts the "power elite" approach to the study of power with the alternative
Those who take the elitist approach argue that there is a relatively permanent "top leadership" which decides the important questions, while the
"pluralist" explanation.

pluralists argue that

of

its

grievances

In a superficial

if

any significant group

in society has the capacity to

the group feels intensely about

its

win redress

problems and demands action.

way, each of these paradigms accurately describes many aspects of

the recent search.

For example, the

"power

trustees, a small

group of power holders, can be identified as a

elite." In this case, the internal struggle for

issue of process versus product.

By changing

their

power centered primarily on
governance policy

the

at the outset

of

the search, the trustees not only reasserted their appointing authority, but they also

diminished the power of faculty and students. All things considered, they saw their

appointment of Michael Hooker to be a judicious exercise of power
the future direction of the university.

Some

in influencing

of them saw the search as a catalytic

event that marked a beginning of a resurgence for UMass. 54

Not everyone will agree with this conclusion, but the trustees so regarded it. In
Hooker was the right choice for the presidency. The inferences they drew
suggest some of their reasons. They saw him as being ideally suited for the job. He
not only met all their criteria, but he also symbolized consensus. As an added
dividend, he happened to be a product of the UMass system. Clearly, as the intensity
of the process built, the trustees considered outcome to be more important than
their eyes,

process.

On

the other side,

many

faculty took a diametrically different stand.

vently believed that a "good process"

would eventually produce

They

fer-

"good president."

a

this analytic framework, they can be identified as "pluralists." As such, they
wanted greater participation in the search, and on their terms. When they were denied

Within

their rights of shared

governance, as defined in the Wellman Report, they saw the

search process as being closed, secretive, undemocratic, not responsive to their concerns, and leaving large discretionary

placed people.

Some

faculty

saw

it

power

in the

hands of a relatively few well-

as a rerun of the old-time old-boy

characterized the efforts that produced Robert

Wood

network

that

as president in 1970. Other

community saw the outcome as being politically predeterview, the trustees had acted in a unilateral manner and had come

mem-

bers of the university

mined. In their

full

cycle.

Citing classic American norms about participatory democracy and belief in the
principles of the

anonymous
ideals.

He

Wellman Report, one

for obvious reasons,

found

faculty colleague,
that the

who

Hooker search

shall
fell

remain
short of these

offered the following scathing critique:

What

really

get a

new

happened

in this search is that the Trustees

decided

University President as quickly as possible, with as
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to

little

go out and
internal
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University consultation as possible, in as
press scrutiny if

it

much

secrecy as possible, and with no

could possibly be avoided. And, in

to violate the University's faculty contract

and the

this context, they

state's

proceeded

open meeting law,

as

well as apparently ignoring serious ethical questions about their final selection

from

(arising

his

immediately previous position), and

in the process nevertheless

generated substantial negative publicity for the University and

And

the only

way

they got

away with

was

it

its

new

President.

that the University faculty

was so

demoralized after previous battles that they just didn't want to put up enough

ef-

fort to protect their legitimate interests.

This interpretation, for

all its

oversimplification and distortion of what transpired,

By

operating in secret and not allowing campus visits
by the candidates, the trustees left themselves wide open for criticism. The dispute
over secrecy and publicity, along with the closed nature of the process, became
central because it focused on a question of enduring significance about which it was

has an element of truth in

it.

impossible to reach a satisfactory resolution. The dispute was significant because

had important implications for the university's claim

to democratic

it

governance and

the diverse nature of the overall system.

Indeed,

it

posed a classic dilemma,

fidentiality while

if

not a conundrum, of

how

to maintain con-

supposedly running an open operation in conformance with

statutory requirements. Yet the issue could not be resolved, because to reveal the iden-

of the candidates was, for

tities

all

practical purposes, to jeopardize their current posi-

Newspapers in particular have complained bitterly about the denial of "the
right to know," but it is not always clear whether this is the public's right to know
what is going on or the newspaper's right to have access to all meetings and
tions.

information.
If the

group effort had a reasonable likelihood to succeed, the trustees were bound

to antagonize

Dan

some people, no matter what they

The

did.

faculty

were miffed because

Taylor had finessed them on the power question, and he did not consult with

them

Though he respected

in advance.

things

would go

their professional

judgment, he concluded that

better if the trustees consulted selectively.

Taylor tried to have

it

Some people

felt that

both ways, reassuring faculty that he wanted their advice while

ignoring their demands for greater participation.

He

understood the need to consult,

but he also understood the need to lead.

Taylor was a capable chairman whose role cannot be overestimated.

He

or-

chestrated and carefully monitored the search process every step of the way. Taylor's

leadership

made

his

homework. To be

identity

were playing a significant part in
and performed well. What is more, he did

the participants feel that they

all

the collective enterprise.

He

sure,

elicited trust

he gave the search a real identity and strengthened that

by putting people of

stature

on the search committee. Taylor's enthusiasm

was infectious. Members felt that too. His relaxed manner and personal charm put
them at ease. He was scrupulous in seeking advice. All accounts substantially agree
on

this.

Although the search committee was too large to function effectively, Taylor overcame this handicap by relying on a small group of key members. Yet the composition
of the committee sent a clear signal that
siders

were going

to

it

was going

to

be a legitimate search.

No

have an inside track on an inside operation. At the same time,

the prestige of the search

committee provided sufficient
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political insulation to

keep

in-

becoming politicized. In some
was feared. Naming four sitting college and university presidents to
the committee was an innovation that gave credibility and judgment to the search.
Faculty, however, tended to see the large committee as no more than a public relathe politicians at a safe distance and the search from

quarters that

tions

gimmick,

not a front. In their minds, the small group that Taylor relied on

if

diminished the representative nature of the

full

committe.

This brings us finally to the question of affirmative action. Despite the best of
tentions, the efforts of the search

committee

left

much

to be desired.

None of

in-

the four

was a minority candidate. As one critic scornfully remarked, "It
wonder why the search committee was willing to go
out of its way and to such lengths to reassure Hooker while letting a perceived negative climate for minorities go unanswered." Why did the eight minority applicants
whom they contacted not show up among the finalists? No single explanation is satisfinalists, as noted,

doesn't take a flaming liberal to

factory. In truth, only the candidates themselves

Part of the answer,

seems

it

me,

to

discernible tiers that were established.

When

the search

committee decided

males (and one white female)
If the

pool

is

shallow, as

at the

was

it

sacrifices in terms of equality

lies in the
It

sachusetts.

It

applies to

cially true in the 1990s,

all

I

top or in the corner office were likely to appear.

diversity.

what one gains

hasten to add,

in

terms of quality one

Another part of the answer had
tier,

to

Mas-

not limited to the University of

is

do

or at the dean level and below.

colleges and universities, public or private. This

when higher education

changes and the search for

to us.

posed the dilemma of the "glass ceiling."

with their not considering anyone in the second
This recruitment problem,

it

shallowness of the pool and the two

to limit the pool to the first tier, only white

in this case,

and

can explain

is

espe-

America is undergoing significant
diverse leadership takes on new meaning and greater imin

portance.

When

all this is

added up, the exercise serves as a reminder

about presidential searches, the context of the Hooker search

that, for

may be

thinking

special,

even

embodied a mixture of something old and something new. In differing
ways, Taylor and his colleagues saw the search as a challenge but also as an opportunity. They did not shirk their duty, nor were they intimidated by the clamorous specunique, for

tacle that

While
that they

it

had occurred a year
it is

earlier.

true that they spotted their

were keenly aware of

man

their choices

early and

went

after him,

it is

also true

and the type of leader they wanted.

any one feature of their work has to be singled out,

it

would be

If

way in
More simply,

the clear

which they defined the job profile. The formula was not a quick fix.
the trustees had an overwhelming desire to settle on a permanent president. With the
passing of time, we shall have a much better perspective and vantage point from
which to judge the new chief executive and his administration. The trustees themselves suggest that it will take at least ten years' time "to reach the end of the beginning." Only then, of course, will we be able to tell whether or not this presidential
search really

made

a difference.

^

Notes
1

.

As

this issue of the

Michael Hooker

New

was

England Journal of Public Policy was going to press, president
engaged in negotiations dealing with the problem of racism on

personally

33

.

New England Journal

of Public Policy

the Amherst campus. For

more on

this,

see Jean Caldwell, "UMass Head Set

to

Tackle

Racism," Boston Globe, October 14, 1992.
Block McLaughlin and David Riesman, Choosing a College President: Opportunities

2. Judith

and Constraints
3.

(Princeton: Carnegie Foundation, 1990), 7.

Duane Lockard, The

and Local Government (New

Politics of State

York: Macmillan, 1969),

330-331
4.

For a journalistic account of the heavy

toll that these budget cuts had taken and the organizasee Anthony Flint, "State Public College System Staggers amid Funding
Cuts," Boston Globe, June 7, 1992.

tional price paid,

5.

See Barry Bluestone

et

al.,

Commonwealth's Choice: Results from the Massachusetts Public
McCormack Institute of Public Affairs, University of Mas-

Opinion Survey (Boston: John W.
sachusetts, January 1990).
6.

McLaughlin and Riesman, Choosing a College President,

7.

Richard M. Freeland, Academia's Golden Age: Universities

(New
8.

xxvi.
in

Massachusetts 1945-1970

York: Oxford University Press, 1992), 345.

For a detailed discussion and in-depth analysis of these

five presidential searches, see
Richard A.~Hogarty, "Searching for a UMass President: Transitions and Leaderships, 19701992," New England Journal of Public Policy 7, no. 2 (Fall-Winter 1991): 9-45. Chairman

made

Daniel Taylor

this article required

reading for

all

members

of the

UMass

presidential

search committee.
9.

McLaughlin and Riesman, Choosing a College President,

Gordon Oakes, chairman

10. Interview with
11.

of the

xxviii.

UMass board

of trustees, July 6, 1992.

Interview with trustee Daniel Taylor, June 15, 1992. By way of academic background, Taylor
graduated from the University of Illinois and obtained a master's degree in political science at
the University of California at Berkeley and a law degree from Harvard University.

12. Interview with faculty

member

Charles Knight, July 23, 1992.

13. Interview with faculty

member

Paul Tucker, July 28, 1992.

14.

See memorandum

of the

UMass board

"Charge

of trustees,

to the

Committee," December

4,

1991.
15.

A

Ronald

Story,

Report:

The ASH Seminar on the Story

"Our Present Ordeal:

I

16. Interview with trustee Daniel Taylor,
17. Minutes of the

UMass

18. Interview with faculty

March

24.

See

A

See

also

"Summary

15, 1992.

Story,

June

19, 1992.

June 22, 1992.

Ronald Stead, June 25, 1992.

from search consultants Ronald Stead and Allan Ostar to trustee Daniel Taylor,

17, 1992.

22. Interview with trustee Daniel Taylor,
23.

16, 1991.

presidential search committee, January 21, 1992.

20. Interview with search consultant

Memorandum

June

December 1991.

Analysis,"

June

member Ronald

19. Interview with trustee Michael Foley,

21.

Historical Note,"

the

final

June

15, 1992.

version of the "Announcement," March 1992.

proceedings of the Fifth Annual Public Affairs Seminar sponsored by the
Institute on the topic "Rx for Recovery: Planned Growth in a Protected
Environment" (Boston: University of Massachusetts, March 1992), 66.
transcript of the

John W. McCormack

25. Report of the

compensation subcommittee, "Recommendations on Compensation and Profes-

sional Relationship with the

New

President," April

34

1,

1992,

2.

26. Ibid.

member John

27. Interview with faculty

Russell, July 8, 1992.

Search Committee," May

28. Daniel Taylor, "Report of the President,

UMass

29. Minutes of the

19, 1992.

presidential search committee, April 6, 1992.

Kenneth Hooker, 2. For an interesting profile of Hooker, see Rushworth M. Kidder, "Special Report: Agenda 2000," Christian Science Monitor, July 25, 1988.

30. Curriculum vitae of Michael

member

31. Interview with faculty

Miren Uriarte, June 27, 1992.

32. Minutes of the

UMass

presidential search committee,

May

6,

33. Minutes of the

UMass

presidential search committee,

May

12, 1992.

34. For more on

A Crisis,"
35. For
sity

this,

1992.

see Gregory Dees and Cecily Harshmand, "Bennington College: Managing

Yale School of Management, 1986.

more on this, see Freeman A. Hrabowski and James J. Linksz, "The Metropolitan Univerand the Community College: A New Symbiosis," Metropolitan Universities 2 (Spring 1992):

71-79.
36.

Dan

Currie,

"Hooker

Named

Mass

President,"

Media, June

2,

1992.

37. Interview with president-elect Michael Hooker, July 8, 1992.
38.

Ibid.

39. Interview with trustee

Mary Reed, May

30, 1992.

40. Interview with president-elect Michael Hooker, July 8, 1992.

41. Interview with trustee

James

O'Leary, July 7, 1992.

UMass/Amherst chancellor Richard O'Brien, September
UMass/Boston chancellor Sherry Penney, June 10, 1992.

42. Interviews with

43. Interview with faculty

44.

Anthony

Flint,

to

Name New

President Today," Boston Globe,

May

27, 1992.

June 23, 1992.

Finnerty,

Ibid.

47. Interview with faculty
48.

Joseph

and

Paul Tucker, July 28, 1992.

"UMass Trustees

45. Interview with trustee

46.

member

29, 1992,

Anthony

Flint,

ton Globe,

member Ronald

"New President

May

at

Story,

UMass

to

June

17, 1992.

Focus on Rebuilding Confidence

in

School," Bos-

28, 1992.

49. Ibid.
50. Minutes of the special meeting of the

UMass board

of trustees,

May

27, 1992.

51. Ibid.

"UMass Trustees to Pay New President $175,000," Boston Globe, August 19,
"New UMass Head Gets Free Luxury Housing," Boston Globe,
1992; "UMass Pay Sends Sour Message," Patriot-Ledger, August 20, 1992; and

52. Frank Phillips,

1992.

See

also Frank Phillips,

August 22,
"Pampering President Hooker," Boston Herald, August 26, 1992.
53. See, for example, the letter to the editor of the

Professor Martin H. Quitt,

who teaches

54. Interviews with trustee Peter

Boston Globe, September 20, 1992, written by
UMass/Boston.

history at

Lewenberg, June 26, 1992, and trustee Alan Solomont, July

1992.

35

9,

